University at Albany, State University of New York

Scholars Archive
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Philosophy

2010

The Identical Rivals Response to Underdetermination
P.D. Magnus
University at Albany, State University of New York, pmagnus@albany.edu

Greg Frost-Arnold
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar
Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Magnus, P.D. and Frost-Arnold, Greg, "The Identical Rivals Response to Underdetermination" (2010).
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 51.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar/51

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Scholars Archive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.

The Identical Rivals Response to
Underdetermination
By Greg Frost-Arnold and P.D. Magnus
published as pages 112-130 of New Waves in Philosophy of Science,
P.D. Magnus and Jacob Busch (eds.) Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when,
inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide
responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be
underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct
theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations
of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals
response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the
response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from
Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin suggests that the response is never
appropriate. Arguments from Einstein for the special and general
theories of relativity may fruitfully be seen as instances of the identical
rivals response; since Einstein’s arguments are generally accepted, the
response is at least sometimes appropriate. But when is it appropriate?
We attempt to steer a middle course between Norton’s view and that of
Laudan and Leplin: the identical rivals response is appropriate when
there is good reason for adopting a parsimonious ontology. Although in
simple cases the identical rivals response need not involve any
ontological difference between the theories, in actual scientific cases it
typically requires treating apparent posits of the various theories as

mere verbal ornaments or computational conveniences. Since these
would-be posits are not now detectable, there is no perfectly reliable
way to decide whether we should eliminate them or not. As such, there
is no rule for deciding whether the identical rivals response is
appropriate or not. Nevertheless, there are considerations that suggest
for and against the response; we conclude by suggesting two of them.

1 Responding to underdetermination
Consider a prima facie case of underdetermination: There seem to
be two theories T1 and T2 such that standards of responsible theory
choice preclude deciding between them. If we accept that the case is as
it seems, then we must decide what to do about T1 and T2. A modest
agnostic response is to suspend judgment. If our actions depend on the
difference between them, then we muddle along in our uncertainty. A
more bumptious response— call this fideism— is to believe one of the
two theories anyway, as an article of faith.1
Of

course,

since

this

is

only

an

apparent

case

of

underdetermination, we might instead try to show that the choice is not
really underdetermined at all. There are again two possibilities. We
might deny that responsible choice between the two is impossible. If
we tinker with the standards of theory choice, then there might be
grounds to prefer one or the other. This is a standard gambit of realists,
who add simplicity, novel prediction, or explanatory power to the
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Regarding fideism, see Magnus (2005a) and also van Fraasen

(2002).

standards that guide theory choice. To highlight the contrast with
agnosticism, call this the gnostic response.
Alternately, we might deny that there really are two rival theories
under consideration. This might seem as bumptious a response as
fideism, but it need not be. Imagine, for example, that T1 is a theory in
French and that T2 is its German translation; that T1 is a theory
expressed in the metric system and that the only difference in T2 is that
values are converted to imperial units; or that T1 is formulated using
Cartesian coördinates and that T2 expresses equivalent claims using
polar coördinates. Surely, standards of responsible theory choice will
be insufficient to prefer one over the other with any of these three pairs.
Within each pair, both of the options are the selfsame theory! One
merits

belief

just

if

the

other

does.

There

really

is

no

underdetermination at all. We might reply to any apparent case of
underdetermination by insisting that the alleged rivals are really just
different formulations of the same theory. Call this the identical rivals
response.
These four responses form a matrix; see figure 1.2
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Sklar (1974, ch 2) and Gardner (1976) offer a similar assessment

of the options.

We do not decide

We do decide between

between T1 and T2.

T1 and T2.

agnostic response

fideist response

The case is judged not

identical rivals

gnostic response

to be underdetermined.

response

The case is judged to
be underdetermined.

fig. 1: Four responses to would-be underdetermination

For positivists, the identical rivals response is always the right one:
Any two theories which cannot be distinguished on observational
grounds have the same meaning and so are the same theory. Positivism
runs into familiar difficulties— and there are probably no positivists
among our readers, anyway— so we set that answer aside. What we
want to know is, under what circumstances is the identical rivals
response appropriate?
The obvious answer is: when the two theories really are identical.
The difficult and interesting question is, rather, what counts as good
evidence for the identity of two apparently inconsistent but
observationally equivalent theories?

Put otherwise, what sorts of

considerations would lead one to view two such theories as identical?
We propose to come at this difficult question in a roundabout way. In
the next section, we consider famous Einsteinian arguments that make
use of the identical rivals response (§2). These examples show that the
response is appropriate in at least some cases. Moreover (as we discuss
in §§3–4) they indicate that the identical rivals response goes naturally

with a parsimonious ontology. We argue further: The identical rivals
response is really only tenable in cases where a parsimonious ontology
is tenable. In §5, we use this connection to provide some criteria for
when the identical rivals response is appropriate.

2 Two examples from Einstein
Einstein employs what is recognizably the identical rivals response
in formulating both the special and general theories of relativity. The
same inferential pattern appears in his 1905 special relativity paper and
reappears, applied to different subject matter, in his justification of the
principle of equivalence, one of the essential steps on the intellectual
road to general relativity.
Einstein (1905/1952) claims that Maxwell’s electrodynamics
suffers from certain faults. He presents these faults via the now-famous
example of a magnet and a conductor moving relative to one another. If
the magnet is regarded as moving and the conductor as being at rest,
Maxwell’s theory claims that an electric field with a certain energy will
come into existence around the magnet, which produces an observable
current in parts of the conductor. However, if the magnet is regarded as
being at rest and the conductor as moving, then there is no electric field
in the neighborhood of the magnet. Instead, an electromotive force is
created in the conductor. This electromotive force gives rise to the very
same current in the conductor as in the first case. If we move with the
magnet, we say that an electrical field is produced around the magnet;
if we move with the conductor, we say an electromotive force is
produced in the conductor. In both cases, however, the current running
though the conductor is the same; if we connected an ammeter to the

conductor, we would measure the same value for the current in both
cases. Einstein draws the following moral from these two cases:
“Maxwell’s electrodynamics... when applied to moving bodies, leads to
asymmetries which do not appear in the phenomena” (1905/1952, 37).
Let T1 be the description according to which the magnet is in
motion and the conductor is at rest; let T2 be the description according
to which the conductor is in motion and the magnet is at rest. T1 and T2
make the same predictions for all observable phenomena. We have a
prima facie case of underdetermination.
In a similar case, Galileo counseled an agnostic response. In his
famous discussion of a moving boat, Galileo concludes that the people
below decks cannot tell whether they are in motion or not— it is ‘as if’
the people are at rest (1967, 116). Given two bodies in relative motion,
Galileo would have said, there is a fact of the matter about whether one
of them is at rest or not— even though no local appearances could
allow us to determine which of the two is moving. In this case there is a
genuine agnostic response to putative underdetermination; it is not
merely a conceptual possibility marked out in figure 1.
Yet Einstein does not give Galileo’s agnostic response. Rather, he
concludes that T1 and T2 are just different descriptions of the same
situation. Although a orthodox physicist in 1905 would think that either
the magnet or the conductor was in true motion, the supposed
difference between two descriptions is illusory. In short, Einstein gives
the identical rivals response.
Einstein deploys the identical rivals response when arguing for the
general theory of relativity as well. His reasoning is especially clear in

the first general relativity seminar he teaches, in the summer semester
of 1919 in Berlin. Hans Reichenbach attended this seminar, and his
notebook contains formulations of Einstein’s that bring out the parallels
to the 1905 paper. Early in the term, Einstein states that both classical
mechanics and the special theory of relativity suffer from a certain
“physical deficiency.” Both rely on the natural law that gravitational
mass equals inertial mass, which has been confirmed “with very great,
astounding exactness” (1919, I.3). Nevertheless, classical mechanics
must take the equality as a brute fact and consequently “there is no
explanation for... [this] most important law of nature.” As Einstein sees
it, though, “we want the numerical equality reduced to an essential
equality” (1919, I.4). Einstein accounts for this equality by the socalled principle of equivalence.3
Einstein considers two frames of reference. The first frame is
inertial, i.e. it has zero acceleration in all three spatial dimensions, but
has a homogeneous gravitational field of strength g directed along the
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Einstein expresses this idea in print. He writes that “previous

mechanics had indeed registered this important law, but had not
interpreted it”. An acceptable “interpretation” of this identity requires
recognizing that one and “the same quality of a body expresses itself,
according to circumstances, as ‘inertia’ or as ‘weight’ ” (Einstein
1917/1997, 40). And elsewhere: “It is...clear that science is fully
justified in assigning such a numerical equality only after this
numerical equality is reduced to an equality of the real nature of the
two concepts” (1922/2002, 56–7).

y-axis in the negative direction.4 The second frame is non-inertial, for
it accelerates in the y-direction at the rate γ, but has zero acceleration
along the other axes. The equations of motion for an observer at rest
with respect to the second frame “are the same equations that describe
motion in the [homogenous] gravitational field. We can thus say: [the
second frame of reference] is at rest, but a gravitational field is present.
We need only set g=-γ. Through this conception, the essential
difference between inertial and heavy mass is taken away” (1919, I.6).
How should one interpret the physical meaning of the equality g=γ? In Reichenbach’s notebook, there is a diagram of the two frames.
Parallel to the y-axis in each, there is a drawing of a spring. Beneath the
drawing, Reichenbach has written: “From the point of view of [the
second frame of reference]: the tension of the spring arises through
gravitational mass. From the point of view of [the first frame of
reference], one judges: The tension of the spring arises through the
inertial resistance of the body, through inertial mass. The same effect,
in one case from inertial mass, in the other case from gravitational
mass,” (1919, I.6) but it is interpreted differently in different frames of
reference.

4

A gravitational field (in a space) assigns to every point in the space

a gravitational vector; this vector is interpreted physically as the
instantaneous acceleration experienced by a test particle at that point in
the space. A gravitational field is homogeneous if and only if the same
vector is assigned to every point in the space; obviously, the
gravitational fields in the vicinity of the sun, the earth, or any other
body are not homogeneous.

The parallel with the 1905 inference is close to the surface. If the
magnet is regarded as resting, then an electromotive force arises in the
conductor; while if the conductor is regarded as resting, then an
electrical field arises around the magnet. In either case, we observe the
same value of the electrical current. Similarly, in the general relativistic
case, if the system is considered to be in motion (constant acceleration)
in a gravitation-free region, then the spring experiences inertial
resistance; while if the system is considered to be at rest in a uniform
gravitational field, then the spring experiences weight due to gravity. In
both cases, a spring-based scale would measure the same force. Given
the meter reading for the spring, we can explain this reading by
positing an inertial force acting on it (the scale is accelerating in a
gravitation-free region), or a gravitational force acting on it (the scale is
at rest in a uniform gravitational field). One could accept this
underdetermination at face value and respond with agnosticism,
holding that one or the other description is correct even though we
limited beings cannot say which. Einstein does not respond in this way.
Rather, he concludes that the two forces are in fact ‘essentially’ the
same, so that there is no real difference between an accelerated spring
in a space free of gravitational forces and a spring at rest in a
homogeneous gravitational field.
The difference between Einstein’s two cases stems from the
difference between the special theory, which maintains the notion of a
privileged set of inertial frameworks, and the general theory, which
attempts to do without such structures. The constant velocity of the
1905 paper is replaced by constant acceleration later. But both of these
arguments pose would-be underdetermination scenarios between two

descriptions, but defuse the underdetermination by way of the identical
rivals response.

3 Ontology and the examples
The previous section illustrated two instances of the identical rivals
response. They are sufficient to show that the identical rivals response
is at least sometimes, if not always, appropriate—at least for
philosophers of science who consider Einstein’s arguments to be good.
Nevertheless, both go beyond the identical rivals response as we
originally posed it. The trivial case was when we imagined the same
theory in French and in German (or in metric and imperial units of
measure, or in Cartesian and polar coördinates)— suppose, for the sake
of concreteness, that we have contemporary biochemistry in two
languages. The theories talk about a great many unobservable things,
like amino acids, enzymes, and so on, as well as their many properties
and relations. When we make the identical rivals response, we accept
each of the theories. We accept that there really are amino acids and
whatnot. For present purposes, it does not matter if this is the practical
acceptance of a constructive empiricist or the belief of a realist. What
matters is that the two theories are understood as positing a rich
ontology of unobservable stuff. We accept the ontologies of the two
theories at face value, and— as part of the identical rivals response—
we insist that the two ontologies are the same.
The two non-trivial examples are importantly different than this.
Consider Einstein’s first argument. If we treat the two representations
as making claims about absolute motion and absolute rest, then
certainly they disagree. Moreover— since there is no absolute

motion— neither description is true.5 It is crucial that Einstein does not
treat them in this way. He is only able to treat them as different
descriptions of the same situation because he prunes their ontological
commitments. There is no absolute motion, only relative motion.
Einstein’s second argument is similar. In employing the identical rivals
response, he prunes any difference between constant acceleration and
gravitation from his ontology. The distinctions drawn in the earlier
theories are merely verbal distinctions without a difference.
So each extended example of the identical rivals response involves
some ontological parsimony; that is, it involves eliminating some of the
things that naïvely seem to be posited by the two theory formulations.
Yet, as the trival examples are sufficient to show, the identical rivals
response is not of necessity eliminativist. So is this just an accidental
feature of the examples from Einstein that we’ve discussed? We argue
that it is not. The identical rivals response, except in trivial cases (such
as

French-German

and

metric-imperial),

requires

ontological

parsimony.
In the next section, we attempt to deliver on this claim.

4 General arguments
Our approach in this section begins with a sort of antinomy: An
argument by John Norton purports to show that (to put it in our
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One might say that they are false, or that they lack truth-values

because of presupposition failure or some other semantic problems. But
false and truth-valueless theories are both unacceptable, so this
difference is unimportant here.

terminology) the identical rivals response is presumptively appropriate
whenever we seem to be faced with empirically equivalent theories. At
the other extreme, an argument by Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin
purports to show that there could never be empirically equivalent
theories. A consequence of the latter argument is that whenever we
seem to be faced with empirically equivalent theories we must be
mistaken; as such, the identical rivals response would never be
appropriate. So these arguments seem to reach incompatible
conclusions. This antinomy is resolved by explicitly acknowledging the
rôle of ontological parsimony in applications of the identical rivals
response. Before arguing for this, we should explain the two
arguments.
THESIS: Anytime we are faced with apparent underdetermination,
the identical rivals response is probably appropriate.

To give the

argument for the thesis briefly:
Suppose we have two theories which are demonstrated to have the
same observational consequences.
Since the observational consequences can be reasoned about in this
way, there must be some tractable description of them. If the
observational consequences of a theory can be described compactly
without recourse to the non-observable posits of the theory, then the
posits are otiose. So we may presume this not to be possible. There are
descriptions of the observational consequences of each theory that
make essential use of the central theoretical terms of that theory.
There are three possibilities: Either the theoretical structures of the
two theories are utterly distinct, one theory has surplus structure, or
they are interconvertible without loss.

(1) The theoretical structure of each theory is what systematizes its
observational consequences. As such, the demonstration that the
theories have the same observational consequences must have
exploited some similarity between the theoretical structures of the two
theories. So we may conclude that the two theories do not have utterly
different theoretical structures.
(2) If one theory has surplus structure, then— since the rival theory
produces the same observational consequences without the surplus—
the structure must be inessential for generating observational
consequences. These are otiose. They are (as Norton says) “strong
candidates for being superfluous, unphysical structures” (2008, 35).
(3) If the theoretical structures are interconvertible without loss,
then we should think that the two theories are really just saying the
same thing.
Since the third possibility is the most likely, we have a strong
reason to think that the two are merely different formulations of the
same theory.
Norton puts the conclusion of the argument this way: “[P]airs of
theories that can be demonstrated to be observationally equivalent are
very strong candidates for being variant formulations of the same
theory” (2008, 35). As we would put the point: The identical rivals
response is probably appropriate for any case in which the theories can
be proven to have the same observational consequences.
Norton’s formulation of the argument is somewhat weaker than
what we have in mind. It “is specifically restricted to those [theories]
whose observational equivalence can be demonstrated in the sort of
compact argumentation that can appear in a paper in the philosophy of

science literature” (2008, 33). And there may be be a gap between a
case being a “very strong candidate” for the identical rivals response
(as Norton says) and the response’s being probably appropriate.
Regardless, the same argument form can be re-deployed to yield the
conclusion that the identical rivals response should be the presumptive
reaction to empirically equivalent theories, and we will refer to this as
‘Norton’s argument’ below.
Norton’s argument raises several issues, but we wish to concentrate
on his answer to the second possibility: one of the theories has surplus
structure that is not essential for producing the theory’s observational
consequences. Toy examples of this kind are easy to produce. Let one
theory be standard particle physics, and let another theory be standard
particle physics plus the posit that there is an undetectable dragon in
my garage. Of course the observational consequences of these two
theories are the same, and one cannot argue on the basis of observation
that there is no dragon. Yet it is tempting to treat the dragon not as an
actual posit of the second theory, treating it instead as “superfluous”
and “unphysical.”
However, refusing to treat dragons as a serious posit of the second
theory is not entirely innocent. Imagine that a century from now there
is a technique for detecting previously undetectable dragons. Future
scientists might come to the place where my garage once stood, turn on
their dragonometers, and decide between these two theories. The
invisible dragon would not be superfluous or unphysical after all.
Returning to the more realistic cases of relativistic physics, it could
turn out that future scientific generations will find good reasons to posit
absolute velocities or to distinguish inertial effects from gravitational

ones. For example, Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics
requires absolute velocity. If Bohmian mechanics is eventually
accepted, then what Einstein considered surplus structure in classical
electrodynamics will once again play an important theoretical role.
Similarly, if future technological developments allow for more precise
versions of Eötvös’s experiments to be carried out, then it is
conceivable that inertial and gravitational forces will need to be pulled
apart again, overturning Einstein’s identification of them in the
principle of equivalence; see, e.g., Einstein (1922/2002, 316.) The
generality of the considerations raised in this paragraph suggest:
ANTITHESIS:When faced with apparent underdetermination, the
identical rivals response is never appropriate. Laudan and Leplin
(1991) argue that, in general, there cannot be logically distinct6 but
empirically equivalent theories. Their reasoning is similar to that of the
previous paragraph. To summarize briefly:
The boundaries of the observable are historically variable;
similarly, the auxiliary hypotheses that scientists employ in making
predictions are historically variable. So take two theories that only
disagree about matters that are now unobservable. We cannot rule out
the possibility that at some time in the future we will develop a way to

6

Depending on how theories are individuated, this should perhaps

be ‘...metaphysically distinct...’ For the terms ‘inertial mass’ and
‘gravitational mass’ are not logically identical, even for Einstein—
however, they are necessarily or ‘essentially’ identical for Einstein: a
sentence of the form ∀x(Px≡Qx) is not a logical truth, but it can be true
in all possible worlds for certain values of P and Q.

observe the relevant differences; similarly, scientists might learn
previously unknown auxiliary laws which connect the previously
unobservable differences with observable consequences. As such, we
cannot say of two such theories that they are empirically equivalent.
In the face of any putative underdetermination, we should deny that
the rivals are empirically equivalent. This precludes employing the
identical rivals response, because if they are the same theory then there
cannot be any empirical difference between them.
If the supposition required at the outset of Norton’s argument were
timeless empirical equivalence with no logical possibility of
observational discrimination, then Laudan and Leplin’s argument
would suffice to show the untenability of Norton’s thesis: even though
two theories may appear observationally equivalent given today’s state
of the art, tomorrow’s unforeseeable new discoveries may overturn this
apparent equivalence. However, Norton’s argument need not suppose
anything so strong. Distinct theories can have the same observational
consequences, given background assumptions about observability.7 For
the purpose of Norton’s argument, we can treat physics-cum-dragon
and

physics-sans-dragon

as

having

the

same

observational

consequences, because we presume as tacit background knowledge that
nothing remotely like a dragonometer exists. Dragonometers, as a very
remote possibility, can reasonably be set aside as science fiction. On a
charitable interpretation, Norton’s argument would take the actual
physical posits of the two theories as probably identical. If the

7

Of course, as Laudan and Leplin note, such assumptions are linked

to auxiliary hypotheses that are themselves historically variable.

‘dragons’ mentioned in on formulation are un-physical posits, then
there is no possibility of their detection.
Refusing Norton’s suggestion and insisting that the dragons might
one day be observable would require a literal reading of the dragon
ontology, but parallel scruples would undo the Einsteinian examples
(from §2.) Consider Einstein’s argument that opens the 1905 special
relativity paper. Just as we can imagine dragonometers, we can imagine
übergyroscopes that could tell the difference between real motion and
absolute rest, and thereby decide which of the two empirically
equivalent descriptions is the true one.8

Or as mentioned above,

Bohmian mechanics, which requires bodies to have absolute velocities,
could eventually be accepted. If there were an ontological difference
between moving the magnet and moving the conductor, then there
might in principle be some way to distinguish between the two. If one
accepts Laudan and Leplin’s argument, then the situation (in Einstein’s
1905 argument) in which the magnet is at rest would not be empirically
equivalent to the situation in which the magnet is in motion— because
imaginable devices and theories could tease them apart. However, the
two competing claims are still underdetermined, in the sense that we
cannot responsibly decide between them, since we have no
übergyroscope.9 Similar considerations apply to differentiating inertial

8

Indeed, responding to van Fraassen’s discussion of absolute space,

Laudan and Leplin imagine discoveries that are tantamount to an
übergyroscope (1991, 458).
9

Although ‘underdetermination’ and ‘empirical equivalence’ are

sometimes

used

interchangeably,

this

case

would

seem

mass and gravitational mass. If one follows Laudan and Leplin, then
our inability to pull these apart would be merely a brute fact, an
observed ‘numerical equality,’ as opposed to an ‘essential equality.’
They offer a version of what we earlier called the ‘gnostic’ response to
apparent underdetermination— provided such fantastic devices, we
could decide between the theories— but the two examples from
Einstein show that the gnostic response is not always appropriate.
Bohmian mechanics and an übergyroscope both presuppose that
there is an absolute difference between motion and rest; they take the
ontologies of the two descriptions to be thoroughly physical, as
opposed to ‘unempirical’ or ‘superfluous.’ The identical rivals response
proposes instead that there is no such thing as absolute rest, so there is
obviously no possible device for detecting it. Switching to Einstein’s
argument for the principle of equivalence, the identical rivals response
is only appropriate because the “numerical equality” of gravitational
and inertial mass is replaced with identity— what Einstein might have
called ‘essential equality.’ The plausibility of Einstein’s eliminativist
ontology is the very reason that his identical rival responses are not
undone by Laudan and Leplin’s considerations. Because the
alternatives describe the same situation, they are logically (or at least
metaphysically) equivalent and so necessarily empirically equivalent. If
the eliminativist ontology is correct, there is no possible future
development that could make them yield different predictions.

underdetermined even though the theories would not be empirically
equivalent. For another such case, see Magnus (2005b).

Returning to Norton’s argument, his answer to the second
possibility is crucial. Ontological parsimony—refusing to take the
excess structure as physical—rules out the possibility that the excess
part will generate detectable differences as science advances. It is
important to note that this eliminativist move is typically a crucial part
of deploying the identical rivals response. We treat undetectable
dragons as superfluous because the rest of science directs us to dismiss
squamous phantoms. Yet we are fallibilists, and we recognize that we
might be wrong; so we cannot banish dragons completely— dragons
and absolute velocities remain (in a weak sense) epistemically possible.
If scientists in a century develop dragonometers or übergyroscopes, our
parsimonious ontology and identical rivals response will prove wrong
in retrospect. Norton’s argument only yields the conclusion that surplus
structures are ‘candidates’ for occamizing; any two theories with the
same observational consequences are candidates for the identical rivals
response. Whether the identical rivals response should be elevated from
mere candidacy to full adoption depends crucially on whether there is
good evidence for ontological parsimony.
Here is another way of making the same basic point. Parties on both
sides of the antinomy can accept the conditional ‘If two theories are
truly empirically equivalent, then they are identical simpliciter.’ The
thesis (Norton’s conclusion) follows from accepting the antecedent
and, by modus ponens, deriving identity. The antithesis (Laudan and
Leplin’s conclusion) follows from rejecting the consequent and, by
modus tollens, deriving their empirical inequivalence. We have
attempted to show in this section that both modus ponens and modus
tollens, as uniform policies, would be rash when facing apparent cases
of underdetermination. The success of Einstein’s gambits shows that

Laudan and Leplin’s modus tollens view is too strong, while Laudan
and Leplin’s plausible point concerning the variability of auxiliary
hypotheses, and resultant variability of what is observable, shows that
modus ponens would be too strong. An important reason why uniform
modus ponens and uniform modus tollens are both too extreme is that
the identical rivals response typically involves (in realistic cases)
ontological eliminativism, and there is simply no rule to always
eliminate or never eliminate—or even a default rule to eliminate or not.
As philosophers should be well aware from debates over several
specific eliminativist proposals, the evidential situation pro or contra
elimination is usually rather subtle and complex.

5 Two conditions, but no rule
The discussion so far shows that the identical rivals response is
sometimes appropriate but cannot necessarily be applied to all cases of
apparent underdetermination. Applying it is not simply a matter of
inspecting the meanings of the would-be rival theories. It is usually a
matter of deciding how to understand them: treat the differences as
substantive physical disagreement, or treat the differences as merely
verbal. We strongly suspect that there is no determinate algorithm for
this decision. We can never with absolute certainty rule out the
possibility that future auxiliary theories might change the observable
consequences of the theories, making today’s superfluous content into
tomorrow’s well-confirmed posit. The point here is not just that such
an outcome is logically possible. The Laudan-Leplin worries can
always be formulated so long as the two rival theories are treated as
genuinely distinct. As such, whether the would-be rivals are merely
variant formulations of the same theory cannot be known with

certainty. Despite the reasonable doubts raised by the Laudan-Leplin
arguments, the two examples from Einstein are sufficient to show that
the identical rivals response is sometimes appropriate.
Even though there is no algorithm, we want to suggest two kinds of
considerations that are relevant to this decision.

5.1 The future discriminability condition
The identical rivals response is ultimately untenable if future
developments will allow for scientists to observationally distinguish
between the rival theories. If future technology can detect absolute
motion, then it is a mistake even now to treat the disagreements about
absolute motion as merely verbal differences. Conversely, the identical
rivals response is tenable if such future developments will not occur.
Call this the future discriminability condition, because it is not directly
available to deliberation in the present moment. It is always a matter of
whether future possibilities will be realized or not.
However, there can be directly available evidence for or against the
future development of observable differences. Before the first neutrino
detectors, it would have been rash to trim them presumptively from our
ontology; scientists reasonably expected that it would eventually be
possible to detect neutrinos, as technology advanced. In cases like
these, it is inappropriate to apply the identical rivals response.10 Such
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This position does not beg the question of realism against the

constructive empiricist. By ruling out the identical rivals response in
such cases, we are only insisting that the theories should be understood
to actually posit ultrasonic vibrations and neutrinos. The realist and the

cases contrast with e.g. absolute velocity, whose inaccessibility to our
senses has nothing to do with its being too small for our visual system
to detect. No matter how powerful our microscopes become, detecting
absolute velocity will not become any easier. It would require an
instrument that works in utterly novel ways, instead of simply
extending our already-existing discriminatory powers. So the identical
rivals response is more defensible here than in the case of neutrinos.

5.2 The heuristic utility condition
Independently, surplus structure may serve a useful heuristic rôle.
Fundamental particles are often posited first only for systematic and
theoretical reasons. They may be treated as genuine physical posits of
the theory for some time before techniques are developed for actually
observing them. Call this the heuristic utility condition: The identical
rivals response is inappropriate when the peculiar posits of a theory are
heuristically useful and guide scientists in developing the theory.
Conversely, the response is appropriate when the posits serve no useful
heuristic role.
A posit might be heuristically useful in this way even if it never
makes an observable difference. Even if a particle theory is revised
before techniques to observe the particle are developed, taking the posit
seriously could be crucial for developing the theory; descendants of the
theory may be ultimately confirmed.

constructive empiricist agree on that much, and we leave them to argue
over whether we should believe in the posits or merely accept as
empirically adequate the theory that posits them.

In the remainder of the section, we consider two examples in which
the internal condition plays a prominent rôle: quantum mechanics in
1926 and the indeterminacy of translation.
In the mid-1920s, Erwin Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and
Werner Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics could have seemed like rival
theories. In wave mechanics, the state of the system changed with time
and the operators were time independent. In matrix mechanics,
conversely, the state was time independent and the operators were time
dependent. Nevertheless, any predictions of either would require both
the state and an operator, and the predictions of each were (in general)
time dependent. So it was natural to think that the disagreement is one
about where to write the variable t, rather than a substantive
disagreement about the world. Indeed, following papers by Schrödinger
and Carl Eckart in 1926, physicists came to treat wave and matrix
formulations of quantum mechanics as different formalisms for the
same theory. As we would put it, they applied the identical rivals
response.
Yet, as Muller (1997) has shown, Schrödinger’s arguments were
insufficient to show that the two were equivalent. Wave and matrix
mechanics did not even have the same observational consequences at
that time! So the two could not have been formulations of the same
theory. Nevertheless, treating them as if they were was fruitful for
physicists. What we are calling the internal condition— heuristic
fruitfulness— vindicates the choice. Less than a decade later, von
Neumann was able to represent the two approaches in terms of Hilbert
spaces. Even though the theories were different in their details in 1926,

successors of the two theories were just different expressions of a more
general formalism.
In this case, as with the other cases we have considered, the
identical

rivals

response

involved

ontological

streamlining.

Schrödinger’s version of quantum mechanics described unobserved
particles as fluctuating bits of jiggly matter; in Muller’s phrase, “tiny
jelly-like lumps of vibrating charged matter” (1997, 229). Treating
wave mechanics as equivalent to the antimetaphyscial matrix
mechanics meant treating these waves as unphysical.
Consider a different example: Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy
of translation is a reaction to a putative underdetermination scenario.11
Quine asks us to imagine two linguists working independently to
translate the totally foreign Jungle language. Each creates a manual for
translating between Jungle and English. The two might create manuals
which prove equally serviceable in interactions between Jungle
speakers and English speakers but which nevertheless disagree about
which Jungle words correspond to which English words. “[T]he thesis
of indeterminacy of translation” is that the two “manuals might be
indistinguishable in terms of any native behavior that they gave reason
to expect, and yet each manual might prescribe some translations that

11

Quine himself recognizes differences between the ‘standard’

underdetermination of theory by evidence in the sciences and his
radical translation scenario. “The indeterminacy of translation is not
just an instance of the empirically underdetermined character of
physics” (1970, 180). We are not concerned here with the nitty-gritty of
Quine exegesis.

the other translator would reject.” (1987, 8). Considered as theories
about the meanings of words in Jungle, the two translation manuals are
empirically equivalent but incompatible theories.
This putative case of underdetermination might be met in any of the
four general ways that we discussed in the introduction. If we took the
agnostic route, we would infer that the existence of the two translation
manuals shows that we English speakers cannot know which
translation of a given utterance in Jungle provides the true meaning of
that utterance.
Quine instead gives the identical rivals response: The existence of
alternative translation manuals shows not that we should suspend
judgment on which is the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ translation, but rather that
neither is the one true or correct translation. As Quine says:
The problem is not one of hidden facts. …The question whether
…the foreigner really believes A [the translation according to the first
manual] or believes rather B [the second manual’s translation], is a
question whose very significance I would put into doubt. (Quine 1970,
pp.180-181)
Although the two manuals seem to disagree about the meaning of
Jungle words and sentences, this appearance results only from thinking
that the two manuals are theories about traditional (i.e. extrabehavioral) meanings of words or sentences. Quine defuses the wouldbe underdetermination by suggesting that there is no such thing as the
traditional meaning of a sentence in isolation, just as Einstein
concluded in 1905 that there is no such thing as absolute velocity.
Different manuals are analogous to different inertial frames of
reference.

If one is going to resist the Quinean deflation of meaning, it will
not be by invoking the future discrimination condition. No one
imagines that future linguists will be able to construct meaning-ometers that determine which translation manual gives the true meanings
of the words. Rather, it must be that there is some theoretical advantage
to positing meanings. Katz (1967; 1997), for example, argues that such
a theoretical advantage exists— that there is a systematic reason
internal to linguistics or semantics for positing meanings.
This is a further illustration of the kind of consideration we have in
mind with the heuristic utility condition: If there is no heuristic or
theoretical advantage of one translation manual over the other, then
there seems no ground left for resisting the identical rivals response.

6 Conclusion
We have argued for two general conclusions regarding the identical
rivals response in actual scientific cases: First, it goes along with
deflating the ontology of one or both theory formulations. The wouldbe rivals are made to agree because the points on which they could
disagree are taken to be merely verbal differences. Second, the
identical rivals response is never necessitated by the situation itself. It
is, rather, a decision under uncertainty. It is a strategic choice about
how to respond to apparent underdetermination.
In the previous section, we suggested two conditions which ought
to influence this strategic choice. The future discriminability condition
suggests that one should not apply the identical rivals response if there
is evidence that future observations will allow you to detect effects of
the posits about which the theories seem to disagree. The heuristic

utility condition states: Don’t apply the identical rivals response if the
extra features of one formulation provide extra heuristic or theoretical
resources for developing the theory. (Although this formulates the
conditions as negative ones, we do not mean to suggest that they
merely operate as roadblocks to the presumptive application of the
identical rivals response. The conditions could be worded postively, in
terms of when the response ought to be applied.)
Note that applying the external condition depends on our
background knowledge. Note also that the internal condition depends
on our present theoretical context; whether something is fruitful or
heuristically useful depends on what else we have to work with. As
such, both of these conditions depend on time and context.
Even acknowledging that Einstein was right to apply the identical
rivals response and treat absolute velocity as an unphysical posit, it
does not follow that the response would have been appropriate earlier.
For Newton, absolute velocity played an important rôle. He could not
see how mechanics could proceed without it,12 so what we have called
the future discriminability condition might have justified his rejecting
Einstein’s arguments (if, anachronistically, he had considered them). In
the mid-nineteenth century, scientists might reasonably have hoped that
the ether would provide a medium in which to measure the Earth’s
absolute velocity; the heuristic utility condition would have justified
their
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manuscript

had
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Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum (1962, II.1; in particular 129131).

anachronistically considered them). It is hard to say when the time was
right for Einstein’s arguments, but certainly it had arrived by the time
he proposed them.
This only seems shocking if we imagine that applying the identical
rivals response is like intuiting a timeless essence. Yet it is not as if
Einstein had peered into the Form of each state description and
recognized them to be the same. Einstein made a scientific argument,
situated in the scientific and evidential context of his time. Applying
the identical rivals response was appropriate only given the background
knowledge and theories of the time. And so it is in any case.
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